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ABSTRACT. Using transaction-level data on Canadian mortgage contracts we document an increase
in the average discount negotiated off the posted price and in rate dispersion. Our aim is to identify
the beneficiaries of discounting and to test whether dispersion is caused by price discrimination.
The standard explanation for dispersion in credit markets is risk-based pricing. Our contracts are
guaranteed by government-backed insurance, so risk cannot be the main factor. We find that lenders
set prices that reflect consumer bargaining leverage, not just costs. The presence of dispersion implies
a lack of competition, but our results show this to be consumer specific.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In many markets prices are determined through a negotiation process between buyers and sell-
ers. Sellers post a price, but consumers may be able to negotiate a discount. This type of pricing
behavior can be found, for example, in the markets for automobiles, for houses, and for banking
products, including consumer loans, investment products, and insurance products. In these mar-
kets, because consumers differ in terms of their profitability with respect to sellers and theirability
to negotiate sizeable discounts, bilateral negotiation leads to price dispersion.
An extensive literature has arisen to try to identify the exact sources of price dispersion in these
markets. In credit markets most of the observed dispersion is attributed to the ability of lenders
to sort borrowers according to their level of risk or to adverse selection (see for instance Edelberg
(2006), Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2009), Einav, Jenkins, and Levin (2013) and Adams, Einav,
and Levin (2009)). We study a sample of newly issued mortgage contracts in Canada that are fully
insured against default by government-guaranteed mortgage insurance providers, which allows
us to disentangle risk from other reasons for price variation and show that risk-based pricing
represents only one possible source of dispersion in credit markets. Since the contracts we study
are insured, if risk-based pricing were the only factor, we should observe little dispersion in rates.
However, despite the fact that we have restricted ourselves to a homogeneous set of mortgages,
we document a substantial amount of rate dispersion. In our sample the coefficient of variation
for discounts in 2004 was 74 percent, leading to economically important differences in the costs
of financing the purchase of a home. Given an average loan of $160,928 in 2004, the extra term
interest cost of paying the rate associated with the 75th percentile discount rather than the 25th
percentile discount is $6,968, or $116 per month.1
This paper has three objectives: (i) document the importance of price dispersion in this mar-
ket, (ii) identify groups of consumers who benefit from banks’ discounting policies, and (iii) test
whether or not part of the observed dispersion can be associated with price discrimination. By
price discrimination here we do not mean race- or gender-based discrimination as in Goldberg
(1996), for instance. Rather we seek evidence that financial institutions set prices that reflect the
relative bargaining leverage of consumers, rather than solely lending costs. When negotiating
with a bank, the bargaining leverage of consumers depends on the value of the next best alter-
native, and on the cost of getting extra quotes. As in other retail markets, the costs and benefits
of obtaining additional offers are affected by market concentration and differentiation between
lenders, as well as the quality of consumers’ information and search costs. In consumer-finance
markets these factors are compounded by the fact that shopping is infrequent, and that there
are important deficiencies in financial literacy (documented for instance by Campbell (2009) and
Campbell, Jackson, Madrian, and Tufano (2011)).
We achieve the first objective by decomposing the variance of transaction rates between ob-
served and unobserved borrower characteristics. We find that throughout the 1990s, the rise of
discounting in the Canadian market was accompanied by an increase in “consumer-based pric-
ing” (i.e. pricing based on measurable characteristics of borrowers), as well as a 60% increase in
1The full amortization interest cost (over 25 years) on this mortgage is $24,903.
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the importance of residual dispersion. At the same time, the fraction of consumers paying the
posted rate plummeted, from 80% in 1992 to 24% after 1999.
In an effort to determine who receives discounts, we estimate the reduced-form relationship
between rates and consumer, lender, and market characteristics. We show that borrowers face
higher rates in more concentrated markets, and that borrowers choosing large network banks pay
higher rates. We also find evidence that rates vary with consumer characteristics. Consumers
who switch financial institutions receive better rates than do borrowers who stay loyal to their
main financial institution. New home buyers pay lower rates than do previous home owners.
Financially constrained borrowers pay higher rates, as do consumers with high credit risk.
A limitation of this reduced-form analysis is that it does not tell us why different characteristics
lead to different rates. It is unclear whether the observed dispersion in rates merely reflects cost-
based pricing, or consumer-specific markups consistent with price discrimination. The standard
approach to testing for price discrimination has been to find controls for costs or competition,
and then to test for dispersion or nonlinearities in prices (c.f. Borenstein and Rose (1994), Busse
and Rysman (2005), Dafny (2010)). This is because in more competitive markets dispersion is
attributed to heterogeneous costs (or profits) of serving consumers, whereas in less competitive
markets dispersion may be the result of rent extraction by the firm.
In this paper we propose two related tests for price discrimination. Both rely on the fact that
in negotiated-price markets competition is transaction-specific and consumers differ in their ob-
servable and unobservable ability to generate price competition. Specifically, we test for discrim-
ination based on observed characteristics of borrowers and mortgage contracts. Our objective is
to identify variables that affect the relative bargaining leverage of consumers. If there is price
discrimination, prices will vary across groups of consumers who have heterogeneous incentive to
engage in search (eg. high vs low income consumers). This observed price difference, which is
associated with markup differences, depends on consumers’ unobserved ability to generate com-
petition. It should disappear for those able to generate competition, but not those unable to do
so. We implement our tests by comparing the marginal effects of observed characteristics across
groups of consumers with different unobserved ability to generate competition (i.e. negotiation
ability).
Our first test is based on quantile regressions. Since we control for a rich set of characteristics
that affect the profitability of the transaction, what remains reflects heterogeneity in unobserved
negotiation ability. We test the stability of the marginal effect on rates of observed characteris-
tics, across the different percentiles of the conditional rate distribution. If price discrimination is
present, the marginal effect should be closer to zero at the bottom quantiles (good unobserved
negotiation ability), than at the middle (weaker negotiation ability). Our findings are consistent
with this form of price discrimination – market structure variables have zero effect at the bottom
and other financial variables have smaller effects at lower quantiles than at higher ones.
Our second test is similar. We compare pricing patterns across broker and non-broker trans-
actions to test whether the marginal effects of characteristics are constant across them. Brokers
have better unobserved negotiation ability than the average consumer, because they are known
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to get more quotes and therefore face a more competitive environment. Controlling for the en-
dogenous selection of brokers by consumers, we test the stability of the marginal effect on rates of
observed characteristics, across broker and non-broker transactions. Again, our results are consis-
tent with discrimination. We find evidence of significant differences in marginal effects in the two
groups, suggesting that borrowers shopping alone are discriminated against relative to borrowers
contracting through brokers.
Alternatively, if there is price discrimination, prices can differ across brokers and non-brokers
if brokers employ a different negotiating strategy than individual borrowers, for instance, by col-
lecting the same number of quotes across different groups of consumers (i.e. blind search). Under
this interpretation, our test is in the same spirit as the price discrimination test proposed by Scott-
Morton et al. (2001, 2003), which consists of comparing prices for cars bought online and offline.
In this context, some characteristics are muted when consumers buy online, and therefore any
conditional price differences based on these characteristics should not exist online if they are as-
sociated with price discrimination (rather than unobserved car characteristics for instance). Our
setting differs from the car market, since we cannot ex-ante identify borrower characteristics that
do not affect the profitability of the transaction absent price discrimination.
Our findings have important implications given the significance of mortgage markets in the
economy, and especially in light of the financial crisis and the focus global regulators have put on
mortgage design. The presence of price discrimination implies that the market is something less
than competitive. However, our findings show that this lack of competition is consumer specific.
Consumers with the knowledge and ability to generate competition amongst lenders pay rates
that reflect their effective marginal cost, while those who are unable to do so pay rates above this.
The consequences of price dispersion in mortgage markets are of first order importance, since it
can lead to excessive debt levels and the possibility of default (Geraldi, Goette, and Meier (2010)).
From a welfare perspective, price dispersion associated with discrimination motives can distort
borrowing decisions by increasing the risk of default on consumers with poor negotiation skills
and by encouraging excessive borrowing. Higher default probability, can induce systemic risks
and generate negative externalities on the overall market.
For policy-makers trying to limit price discrimination, our results suggest that, not only is the
number of banks in a market important, but so is consumers’ ability to put banks into competi-
tion by searching over and negotiating with multiple lenders. By doing so borrowers make price
discrimination more difficult. These findings point to the need for policies aimed at increasing
financial literacy in order to improve the negotiation abilities of borrowers. Deficiencies in this
area can lead consumers to overpay for loans.
Our findings also suggest that policies designed to increase transparency or improve financial
literacy may have distributional effects. Not all consumers will benefit from these policies. Bor-
rowers who are able to actively engage in search and/or who are good at negotiation will not be
helped by these policies, and may actually be hurt if prices are more uniform as they would be
under a no-haggle policy. In contrast, policies designed to increase competition by bringing more
negotiation partners to the table will serve only to benefit those consumers who engage in search
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and negotiation. Consumers who are unable or unwilling to obtain multiple quotes will not be
affected by the level of competition in the market. The other side of this is that policies designed
to limit concentration, for instance by preventing mergers, will provide limited benefit for those
consumers paying the highest rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents an overview of the Canadian mortgage
market and discusses pricing and negotiation. Section III presents a description of the household-
level data. Section IV contains our main analysis. To frame our discussion we begin by presenting
a two-stage negotiation model and then we describe the empirical analysis. Section V concludes
and discusses the policy implications of our findings. Tables and figures are presented in the
Appendix.
II. THE CANADIAN MORTGAGE MARKET
II(i). Market structure. The Canadian mortgage market is dominated by the “Big 6” Canadian
banks, a regional cooperative network – Desjardins – and a provincially owned deposit-taking
institution – Alberta’s ATB Financial.2 Collectively, they control 90 percent of assets in the banking
industry and are called the “Big 8”. Their dominance stems from the period of consolidation that
followed the 1992 Bank Act, when the large banks acquired nearly all of the trust companies. Until
that point trust companies played an important role in the mortgage market, controlling nearly
45% of all newly issued mortgages. In the mid to late 1990’s there was also entry of foreign banks
such as ING, but their market share remains relatively small throughout our sample period.
The evolution of the banking system after 1992 has led Canadian households to treat their pri-
mary bank as a “one-stop shop” (universal bank) where they purchase the majority of their fi-
nancial services. Nowadays, 67 percent of Canadian households have their mortgage at the same
financial institution as their main checking account. See Table I for a description of the distribution
of financial services across households’ main financial institutions.
Most Canadian banks operate nationally and post mortgage rates that are common across the
country. Lenders typically post rates for their different products on a weekly basis in both national
and local newspapers, as well as online. This is different than in the United States, where even na-
tional lenders such as Bank of America post different mortgage rates on their web-site depending
on a consumer’s zip code.3 There is little dispersion in posted prices, especially among the Big 6
banks. In fact, the coefficient of variation on posted rates for the Big 6 during the early part of our
sample period is always around zero (see Allen and McVanel (2009)).
II(ii). Pricing and negotiation. In shopping for a mortgage contract one option for consumers is
to pay the posted rate. However, in Canada this is not their only option. Local branch managers
have the authority to offer borrowers discounts below the posted price under general guidelines
from headquarters. The role of discounts is, on the one hand, to retain consumers who obtain
2The big 6 are: Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Banque Nationale, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Royal
Bank Financial Group, and TD Bank Financial Group
3Canadian banks operating in the U.S. also use this strategy for their U.S. locations.
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competitive quotes from multiple lenders, and, on the other, to set a rate that reflects the char-
acteristics of borrowers. Branch managers are also compensated in part by the size of loans and
volume of discounts, which can influence their pricing decision (see KPMG (2008)). Importantly,
Canadian lenders do not offer the option of buying points to reduce rates; it is the responsibility
of consumers to negotiate discounts. It is also a reasonable assumption that this negotiation in-
volves mostly the determination of the final interest rate since lenders directly control relatively
few fees associated with housing transactions.4 Rather than settle for the posted rate, consumers
face two options. One approach is to hire a broker to search for the best rates on their behalf.
Brokers penetrated the Canadian market starting in the mid 1990’s, and by 2004 were responsi-
ble for negotiating roughly 40% of new contracts. Figure 1 presents the evolution of the share of
transactions that were broker-assisted in our sample.
Unlike in the United States (with the exception of California), brokers in Canada have fiduciary
duties. Brokers are compensated by lenders, but “hired” by borrowers to gather the best quotes
from multiple lenders. Typically, brokers are compensated between 1-1.3 percent of the volume
of mortgages that they bring to a lender in a month.5 Borrowers could potentially hire several
brokers, something we cannot observe. Recent surveys by Maritz Canada and CAAMP (Maritz
(2012) and Dunning (2011)) suggest that mortgage brokers contact on average 4.5 lenders for each
contract.
The second option is for borrowers to independently negotiate the rate, for instance by gather-
ing quotes from multiple lenders. Our data do not provide information on the number of quotes
gathered by borrowers, but survey evidence from CAAMP reveals that only 54% of consumers
gather more than one quote. On average, these borrower negotiate with 2.25 financial institutions
when searching for a mortgage. Importantly, branch managers that are part of the same bank
network are typically not allowed to compete by responding to each other’s offers. Therefore, the
level of competition facing each borrower is more accurately measured by the number of different
financial institutions present in the same region, than by the number of local branches.
It is important to note that discounting has not always been the norm in Canada. Until the mid
1990s very few Canadians received any discount on their mortgage.6 The move towards discount-
ing coincided with important changes to the structure of the Canadian banking industry. Beyond
4Many fees required in the U.S. are not in Canada: home inspection fees (not required by lender), land registration fees
and property taxes (paid to the municipality), and legal fees (paid to a notary or lawyer). Some other fees, may be
negotiable, but anecdotal evidence suggests this is rare. For instance, a property assessment fee of 250 to 350 dollars is
almost always waived by the lender unless the price of the home is substantially greater than the market value. Recently
journalists at the Globe & Mail revealed through an access to information request that since 1996 borrowers who buy
mortgage insurance in Canada have not had their properties assessed. http : //www.theglobeandmail.com/report −
on− business/economy/housing/potentially − flawed− data− used− by − banks− and− lenders− bump− up−
house − prices/article4603237/. Before 2006 mortgage insurance providers charged an underwriting fee of 75 to 165
dollars for mortgage insurance, which could be waved by the lender. The lender could offer a preferable rate on
property insurance rather than a mortgage rate discount; but this is unlikely as Canadian banks are not permitted
to sell insurance inside their branch. There is also some evidence that lenders will in rare instances negotiate on the
fraction of the contract that can be prepaid without penalty.
5In contrast, in the U.S. brokers receive both a cash-fee from the borrower and a yield-spread premium from the lender.
The yield-spread premium is an increasing function of both the loan size and the interest rate, therefore brokers in the
U.S. do not have an incentive to find borrowers the lowest rate (e.g. Hall and Woodward (2010)).
6This was also true in the US. See for instance Duca and Rosthenal (1994) and Edelberg (2006).
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the disappearance of trusts and the entry of foreign players and mortgage brokers, several tech-
nological innovations occurred during this time including the advent of LAN and the internet,
the automatization of underwriting processes, and the introduction in 1996 by the main insurance
company, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMCH), of an automated approval sys-
tem. Overall, these changes have made it easier for lenders to decentralize pricing and lending
decisions, and offer borrower-specific rates as a function of measurable characteristics.7
II(iii). Default risk and insurance. Canadian borrowers face two broad contract categories: con-
ventional mortgages (low loan-to-value), that are typically uninsured but can be privately insured,
and high loan-to-value mortgages, that require insurance. About 73 percent of residential mort-
gages and over 80 percent of new home-owner contracts require insurance coverage.8 This is be-
cause mortgage insurance is required for households borrowing more than 75 percent of the cost
of the home. Mortgages are insured by either the government insurer CMHC, or a private insurer,
Genworth Financial Canada.9 The government of Canada explicitly backstops both insurers, and
determines the insurance premiums. These are typically rolled into the mortgage and financed
over the full amortization, and range from 1.75 to 3.25 percent of the loan (strictly a function of the
LTV).
When financing an insured mortgage contract, banks assume only the transaction-cost compo-
nent associated with default risks. Except in the case of mortgage fraud, the mortgage insurer is
responsible for covering the full amount of the claim and costs (including servicing costs, filing
costs, delayed payment costs, etc.). In order to reduce moral-hazard risks associated with excess
lending, the government sets minimum standards for insured mortgages, and the final decision
on whether a mortgage application is accepted rests with the insurer. In addition to the 75 per-
cent LTV rule, the government requires that households have a debt service to gross income ratio
of less than 32 and a total debt service ratio of less than 40.10 These lending standards remained
7Similar innovations have been associated with an increase in consumer-based pricing in other credit markets. The
development of ‘risk-based pricing’ has been facilitated by technological advances that make credit scoring much less
costly than it was twenty years ago and has been encouraged by the fact that it can be significantly more profitable than
uniform pricing. Einav, Jenkins, and Levin (2013) study pricing and contract design in the subprime auto-sales market
and find that using credit scoring to determine down-payment sizes can increase profits by 42 percent per applicant
relative to uniform pricing. For a theoretical analysis of the benefits of information technology of bank profits see
Hauswald and Marquez (2003).
8The percentage of government guaranteed mortgages is calculated as total insurance in force over total residential
mortgage credit. As of 2009 CMHC had 473 billion CAD, Genworth 224 billion CAD and Canada Guaranty about 5
billion CAD of insurance in force in a market of 965 billion CAD.
9Genworth Financial entered the Canadian market in late 1995 and has grown to about one-third of the market.
10Gross debt service is defined as principal and interest payments on the home, property taxes, heating costs, annual
site lease in case of leasehold, and 50 percent of condominium fees. Total debt service (TDS) is defined as all payments
for housing and other debt. Both measures are as a percentage of gross income. Crucial to the guidelines is that the
TDS and GDS calculations are based on the posted rate and not the discounted price. Otherwise, given mortgages are
insured, lenders might provide larger discounts to borrowers above a TDS of 40 in order to lower their TDS below the
cut-off. The guidelines are based on the posted rate to discourage this behavior.
6
constant during our sample period, and were relaxed only slightly post-2006. As a result of these
relatively strict lending rules, the rate of default in Canada has been extremely low.11
II(iv). Mortgage contracts. Another feature of the Canadian market, is the relative simplicity of
the menu of contracts offered by lenders. Since the 1960’s, the standard contracts offered by Cana-
dian lenders are fixed-rate mortgages with five-, three-, or one-year terms. These contracts must
be renegotiated at the end of the term period, which in effect acts like an adjustable rate mortgage
with a fixed time-frame to renegotiate.12 During our sample period, over 92 percent of mortgage
contracts were fixed rates, among which over 80 percent had a 5 year term (the second most com-
mon term was 36 months, with 13 percent of the sample).
In an effort to reduce pre-payment risks over the fixed-rate period, banks also impose substan-
tial penalties for borrowers trying to renegotiate their contract before term.13 Most lenders give
borrowers a 15 percent (and sometimes as high as 20 percent) prepayment option per year. Any
unused prepayment room expires at the end of each year. Beyond this amount, borrowers face
penalties that amount to the greater of three months of interest or the interest rate differential
(IRD) between the locked-in rate and the market rate times the number of remaining years (see
Lascelles (2010)). This effectively neutralizes any financial incentive to renegotiate in quest of a
lower borrowing rate as the cost precisely offsets the advantage.
III. MORTGAGE CONTRACT DATA
Our main data-set is a sample of insured mortgage contracts obtained directly from CMHC
and Genworth. From the former, we obtained a 10 percent random sample of new mortgage
contracts issued between 1992 to 2004, sampled by Census Metropolitan Area (CMA).14 Genworth
provided us with their full set of loans issued between 1996 and 2004. Since these contracts are
over-represented relative to CMHC’s, we randomly selected Genworth contracts to match their
aggregate market shares for each year.
Both CMHC and Genworth only began collecting key household-level information in 1998, and
therefore much of our empirical analysis focuses on the 1999-2004 period. In total we have access
to 20 household/mortgage characteristics (see Table II), including all of the financial characteris-
tics of the contract (i.e. rate, loan size, house price, debt-ratio, risk-type), the lender identity (for
the 12 largest lenders), and some demographic characteristics (e.g. income, prior relationship with
the bank, residential status, dwelling type). In addition, we observe the location of the purchased
11According to a recent report by the Royal Bank of Canada (Hardy and Mun (2009)), the historical average cost of
mortgage default in Canada is 2 basis points per year. Historical delinquency rates in Canada are less than 0.5%, about
ten times smaller than in the U.S.
12The term does not affect the amortization period, which is set to 25 years for 98% of contracts issued during our
sample period.
13Findlay and Capozza (1977) use option theory to illustrate the cost to lenders of fixed-rate mortgages with an open
option to prepay and therefore the advantages of variable-rate mortgages and also why there are prepayment penalties.
14Breslaw, Irvine, and Rahman (1996) have previously used this data to study mortgage term and amortization choice
between 1980-1988.
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house up to the forward sortation area, which is a finer measure than the CMA. While the aver-
age forward sortation area (FSA) has a radius of 7.6 kilometers, the median is much lower at 2.6
kilometers.15
Since we are interested in explaining patterns of rate dispersion across households, we restrict
our sample to contracts with homogenous terms. In particular, our analysis focuses on contracts
with a 25 years amortization period, and 5 year fixed-rate term. This represents the largest cat-
egory of contracts issued during our sample period. Our analysis focuses only on newly issued
mortgages so we exclude home-owners that are either refinancing or renewing their mortgage
contract.
Table III presents summary statistics of the discrete variables for our restricted sample of 5 year
fixed rate mortgages amortized over 25 years. Over 20 percent of the borrowers in our sample
owned a home at the time of the contract. These previous owners are obtaining a mortgage for a
new property, but still do not have enough equity in the previous house to avoid paying insurance
on their new one. The remaining new home owners are exiting from renting or living with their
parents. We also find that the majority of Canadians buy detached homes, and that by the late
1990’s the market share of brokers was over 30 percent.16
Table IV displays the market share of brokers and branches by type of financial institution. The
vast majority of mortgage contracts that are with the Big 6 banks are negotiated at branches, with
only around 28 percent of contracts using brokers. In contrast, over half of contracts with trusts
use brokers (57 percent), as do almost 80 percent of contracts with other financial institutions.
Summary descriptions of continuous variables are presented in Table V. We present the mean,
median, and standard deviation for (i) the full sample, (ii) a sub-sample of previous home-owners,
and (iii) a sub-sample of new home-owners. The purpose of splitting the sample in this way is to
explore the possibility that more experienced home-buyers have a different mortgage shopping
experience than first-time home-buyers.
For the full sample the mean borrower has been with his/her financial institution 48 months
before the contract is signed, about 7 months more than the mean for new home-owners and 20
months less than the mean for previous home-owners. The difference between owner-types is
more stark when looking at the median relationships, 1 month for new buyers and 40 months for
previous owners. Previous owners are more loyal.
The average household income is different across residence groups: new home-owners are
about $11,000 poorer than existing home owners (i.e. $65,692 versus $76,638). This difference
is reflected also in the house price, and in the loan size. The mean loan is about $143,849 to pur-
chase a $158,760 home (all in 2002 dollars). The LTV for new home-buyers is slightly higher than
than of previous home buyers.
15The FSA is the first half of a postal code. There are over 1,300 FSA’s in Canada, and over 850,000 postal codes.
16As far as we are aware, during our sample period all lenders except the largest in the country, RBC, process broker-
business. Rather than use mortgage brokers RBC relies more heavily on in-house mortgage specialists (most financial
institutions have mortgage specialists in addition to using brokers). These are broker-like individuals that only work
for one lender. In 2006 BMO stopped using independent brokers, following RBC’s example.
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The majority of households in our sample invest the minimum down-payment of 5 percent.
Figure 2 plots LTV ratios. LTV ratios are highly localized around 90 and 95, and to a lesser extent
75, 80, and 85. This clustering reflects the piece-wise linear form of the insurance pricing schedule.
An average total debt service ratio (TDS) of 32 is relative low compared to the guideline maxi-
mum of 40. Figure 2 presents a histogram of borrowers’ total debt service ratios. Given the heavy
right-skewness of the distribution the constraint does appear to be binding for a large number
of households. Previous home-owners and first-time home-owners have similar TDS ratios. The
full sample TDS is less than the TDS for the two sub-samples, suggesting that the TDS is slightly
higher on average for households insured by CMHC than Genworth Financial. From the TDS
ratio we construct a measure of other debt which is defined as TDS times income minus mortgage
payments evaluated at the posted rate.
In order to measure the degree of competition facing each borrower, we use data on the dis-
tribution of branches between 1998-2004. This information is provided by Micromedia-Proquest.
We use this information to construct two key measures of concentration by local market. First, we
construct a branch Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the FSA level with a 5 KM radius around the
centroid of the FSA. Summary statistics are presented in Table V. The mean HHI is 0.202 and the
standard deviation is 0.111. The second market structure variable is a borrower-specific which we
denote Relative network. It is calculated as the fraction of branches in a neighborhood owned
by the borrower’s lender over the average branch network of other lenders. The mean relative
network is 1.27 and the standard deviation is 0.99. For more details on the evolution of branch
networks in Canada see Allen, Clark, and Houde (2008).
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In an effort to frame our empirical investigation, we begin by presenting a simple two-stage ne-
gotiation model in which a borrower and a lender bargain over a mortgage interest rate. Formally,
borrower i is matched with lender j, and together they negotiate a mortgage interest rate pij . The
outcome of the negotiation depends on lender/borrower specific costs cij , and on the borrower’s
outside option generated by getting quotes from other lenders in his/her neighborhood if nego-
tiations fail with j. The transaction surplus for consumer i is therefore given by the difference
between the net utility of borrowing from j, vij = θj − pij , and i’s outside option, vi0 = θ0 − pi0.
To simplify the analysis we assume that lenders earn zero profits if negotiations fail.
The difference between vij and vi0 determines the bargaining leverage of consumer i. The value
of the outside option θ0 is a function of the characteristics of available lenders, and the search cost
of getting additional quotes. The price pi0 that consumers can obtain by shopping is the outcome
of a competition game between available lenders. Rather than explicitly modeling the outcome of
the second stage, we assume that pi0 can be expressed as a reduced-form margin µ(ui) over lender
j’s cost. Specifically, the outside option price is: pi0 = cij + µ(ui). We index consumers by their
ability to search for and negotiate good discounts, and so µ is a decreasing function of ui. We use
this notation to characterize the heterogenous ability of consumers to gather competitive quotes
from multiple lenders. Notice that pi0 can be lower than cij when borrowers are able to contact
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more cost-efficient lenders, and borrowers have positive valuation for the first lender they visit
(i.e. θj − θ0 > 0).
We assume that information is symmetric and complete across both parties, and use a Nash bar-
gaining solution concept with equal bargaining weights to approximate the outcome of the initial
negotiation stage. The transaction price therefore equally splits the overall transaction surplus:
(1) pij = cij +
1
2
(θj − θ0 + µ(ui)) ≡ cij +mij(ui).
This reduced-form pricing equation highlights the two components of what we label consumer-
based pricing: lending cost factors and price discrimination. Any differences in prices that are
not related to differences in risk or differences in the cost of loan provision are a result of price
discrimination on the part of lenders stemming from differences in search costs, outside options,
negotiation ability, etc. Both components are functions of observed and unobserved factors. We
use the mij(ui) notation to emphasize the fact that the last component includes an inherently
unobserved element. This is because we mostly observe financial characteristics of the transaction,
and few measures of the actual negotiation process. However, as discussed in Section II(ii), we
know that borrowers employ heterogenous search and negotiation strategies when shopping for
mortgages, and so have heterogeneous outside options.
The first objective of our empirical analysis is to measure the importance of consumer-based
pricing. In Section IV(i), we do so by quantifying the cross-sectional dispersion of transaction
rates, as well as the relative contribution of borrower characteristics to the observed variance.
In Section IV(ii), we then study directly the reduced-form correlation between observed charac-
teristics and transaction rates, by estimating a linear approximation of equation 1. This does not
allow us to make causal statements, since the marginal effect of a variableXij on rates reflects both
a change in the lending cost cij , and a change in the price discrimination profits mij . It is nonethe-
less an important empirical exercise, as it allows us to identify the winners and losers from the
discounting pricing policies of Canadian financial institutions.
The third objective of our analysis is to provide empirical evidence in favor of the existence
of price discrimination. More specifically, we are interested in testing whether or not banks set
interest rates that reflects the heterogeneity in borrowers’ outside options, measured by mij(ui) in
equation 1. Our econometric tests are based on the idea that if this form of price discrimination
exists, the marginal effect of observed covariates on mij should differ across groups of consumers
with different levels of ui.
The argument is as follows. We study mortgage contracts that are homogenous, and subject
to common floors and ceilings (i.e. risk-free and posted rates). This implies that consumers with
good negotiation skills (i.e. high ui) are able to generate sufficient competition between lenders
to pay rates that reflect the cost of lending. On the other hand, consumers with weak negotiation
skills or high search costs face an outside option that reflects the minimum of the common posted
interest rate (maximum quote), and their willingness to pay for renting a house. In the first case the
value of m is zero, while it is equal to a constant for low ui consumers. The following assumption
summarizes these properties.
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Assumption 1. The profit margin function satisfies the following three properties:
(1) ∂mij(ui)∂ui ≤ 0
(2) mij(ui) = 0 ∀ ui > ū
(3) mij(ui) = m̄ ∀ ui < u
These properties cannot be tested directly without observing mij(ui). However, we can test an
implication of them with respect to the marginal effect of observed transaction characteristics on
transaction rates. Consider a variable xi that affects only the value of the outside option. Assump-
tion 1 implies that the marginal effect of xi on the transaction price is zero for consumers at the top
and bottom of the distribution of negotiation ability ui. Similarly, if a variable zi determines solely
the cost of lending, its marginal effect on price should be constant across all levels of ui (up to the
constraint imposed by the posted price where the marginal effect is zero). For variables that affect
both functions, a non-zero effect for consumers with low ui’s identifies cost variations, while it
reflects the sum of both a discrimination and cost effect for consumers with intermediate values
of ui. Overall, if there is price discrimination, the marginal effects should be decreasing in ui for
consumers who are not constrained by the ceiling (ui < u).
The previous argument rests on the assumption that the shape of the lending cost function is in-
dependent of unobserved negotiation skills, and of factors determining the quality of consumers’
outside options. This is justified in our context by the Nash bargaining assumption, which im-
plies an additive functional form, and by the fact that we can control for a rich set of financial
characteristics that we think approximate well the lending cost component.
To implement this idea empirically, we provide two methods to identify groups of consumers
with heterogenous ui. In Section IV(iii) we use quantile regressions to test the stability of the
reduced-form relationship between observed covariates and transaction rates across different per-
centiles of the unobserved components of transaction prices (i.e. ui in the model). Then, in Section
IV(iv) we compare the marginal effects across contracts that were negotiated with and without the
help of a mortgage broker. These two groups of transactions differ if brokers, on average, search
more effectively for quotes, and/or if brokers use a different “search-technology” (e.g. different
µ(ui) function). We perform this analysis controlling for the endogeneity of the broker decision.
IV(i). Measuring price dispersion. From the Globe & Mail newspaper archives we collected
posted-mortgage rates on a weekly basis. Using this information along with our transaction data,
we can calculate discounts and study their prevalence in the Canadian mortgage market. Table V
presents the sample means and standard deviations for both the transaction price less the adjusted
bond rate and the posted price less the adjusted bond rate.17 The difference between the two is
the mean discount. Over the full sample, the mean discount is 68 basis points and the median is
73 basis points. The average discount represents 11 percent of the posted interest rate.
17Banks use swaps to hedge the fact that they hold short-term liabilities (deposits) and long-term assets (mortgages).
As the swap market developed, bond rates (including mortgage rates), became more closely linked to banks’ funding
costs at long maturities (Allen and McVanel (2009)).
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Figure 3 characterizes the weekly evolution of three interest rates between 1992 and 2004: the
median transaction rate, the median posted rate by the Big-8 banks, and the five-year swap-
adjusted bond rate. The figure illustrates how discounting has become the dominant pricing pol-
icy over the 12 years of our sample. The market transitioned from an environment in which the
median borrower paid the posted interest rate for most of the weeks before 1997, to one in which
there exists a spread of about 100 basis points between the posted interest rate and the median
transaction rate after 1999. Note that prior to 1997, but especially in 1994, there are some weeks
where the median transaction rate appears to be above the posted rate. In principle, we should
never see this since negative discounts are not permitted in Canada.18 However, the premiums we
observe come about because of how our data are administered and rates are negotiated. Typically,
a borrower will negotiate a rate several weeks prior to the purchase of the home, and this rate can
be adjusted until the purchase date. Since we only observe the closing date on the house sale, we
identify the negotiation week by calculating the absolute difference between the transaction rate
and the posted rate for the weeks within 90 days of the closing date, and take the smallest value,
and/or the closest in time in case of a tie.19 Therefore, if the posted rate falls and the borrower
does not renegotiate, the discount could be counted as negative.
The average profit margin has remained remarkably stable over the entire period. Excluding
1994, the average transaction margin oscillated between 82 and 165 basis points. In other words,
despite the increase in discounting, the average borrower is as well off in 2004 as in the early
1990’s. However, these trends hide the fact that not all borrower-types experience gains relative to
the posted rate. This can be seen in Figure 4. The boxplot illustrates the cross-sectional dispersion
in transaction rates for 5-year fixed rate mortgages. Since there is a substantial amount of price
dispersion coming from week-to-week changes in posted rates, we subtract from the transaction
rate the within-week median. The figure reveals a fairly steady increase in the amount of cross-
sectional dispersion between 1992 and 2000. There is a slight increase in dispersion from 1993 to
1994 related to the rapid increase in interest rates.
Despite our interest in discounts, the focus of our analysis in the remainder of the paper is on
margins because we do not have the posted rate for some of the smaller financial institutions.
Transaction-level margins are measured by subtracting a five-year swap-adjusted bond rate. To
study the importance of consumer-based pricing, we decompose the observed margin dispersion
between four groups of observed covariates: closing month, financial characteristics, location (i.e.
FSA), and lender/network size. Each category divides borrowers into discrete groups, and contin-
uous variables are discretized by quartiles. The closing month variable quantifies the importance
of the posted-rate on the cross-sectional dispersion of prices, while the other three groups approx-
imate observed characteristics of each transaction: financial, market structure, and lender.
The results in Table VI summarize this variance decomposition for two periods: 1992-1998 and
1999-2004. In columns (1) and (3), we report the predicted and observed standard-deviation of
18In the U.S., for example these premiums for high-risk borrowers are called “overage” and there is evidence that they
are more likely to be charged to minorities, e.g. Courchane and Nicerkson (1997) .
19From this, we estimate that 44% of contracts are negotiated within 1 week of the closing week, and the remaining are
uniformly distributed between 1 week and 90 days.
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margins for each group, as well as the residual and nominal dispersion. The overall standard
deviation of margins is around 64 basis points in both periods. Over time, the importance of the
residual dispersion component increased by 10 points, from 46 to 55 basis points, while the role
of the posted-price shrank considerably, from 41 to 27 basis points. The rise of the predicted dis-
persion from the transaction characteristics explains the difference. Individually, however, these
characteristics predict a relatively small amount of dispersion.
The Variance decomp measure splits the observed margin variance into its different components.
Columns (3) and (4) confirm the increase in consumer-based pricing over time. It is clear that
there is an important shift away from month-to-month pricing, with the fraction of the variance
explained by closing month falling to 18% from 42%. As Figure 3 illustrates, this decline is easily
explained by the fact that the fraction of consumers paying a rate within 10 basis points of the
posted rate went from 70% in 1992-1993, to 24% between 1999-2004. The overall contribution of
consumer financial characteristics increased from 1.6% to 2.3%. The fraction explained by loca-
tion dummies increased the most suggesting an important role for local market characteristics in
determining transaction rates, including the level of competition between lenders. Overall, the
major shift between the two periods is the rise in residual dispersion, which accounted for more
than 74% of the total variance between 1999-2004, compared to 53% between 1992-1998.
Having documented the existence of price dispersion, in the remainder of this section we out-
line which consumer, contract, and market characteristics are associated with higher and lower
rates, and determine the extent to which variation related to these characteristics simply reflects
cost differences, or instead is indicative of price discrimination.
IV(ii). Who receives discounts? In this subsection we examine the marginal effects of covariates
on rates. This part of the analysis is purely descriptive, and is informative about the size of dis-
counts systematically given to certain groups of consumers. In order to decompose margins into
loan, bank, consumer, and market effects we estimate the following linear approximation of equa-
tion 1:
(2) Margini = Xiβ + εi,
where Margini is measured relative to the five-year bond-rate at the negotiation date, and Xi is a
set of observed borrower and contractual variables.
Estimation results are presented in Table VII. All specifications include bank and week fixed
effects, along with the FSA-level census variables. Column (1) uses all of the contracts from 1999
to 2004 and from both insurers, while column (2) uses only the CMHC sample. The reason is that
the Genworth sample is missing information on certain demographic characteristics. Comparing
columns (1) and (2) we can see that results are essentially unchanged. Columns (3)-(4) further
restrict the data to various subsamples. In column (3) we drop the period from November 2002
to August 2004. TD-Canada Trust was experimenting with a no haggle policy during this period,
which could have an effect on our estimates. In column (4) we restrict attention to contracts signed
with the Big 8 financial institutions.
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We consider first the effect of market structure on margins. We find that, on average, rates are
higher in more branch-concentrated neighborhoods (HHI). In the full sample a one-standard de-
viation increase in market concentration is associated with a 1.1% increase in margin. Relative network
is a borrower-specific variable and is calculated as the fraction of branches in a neighborhood
owned by the borrower’s lender over the average branch network of other lenders. We conclude
that consumers who choose to transact with larger network banks pay more. A one standard
deviation increase in relative size is associated with a 1.9% increase in the banks’ margin.
Turning to household characteristics we start by studying the relationship between household
income and rates. If we do not condition on house prices, we find that richer households pay
lower rates. However, once we condition on house price, as we do in the table, we find a positive
relationship between income and rates, suggesting that the negative correlation is due to house
price. The house price variable reveals that more expensive homes are associated with discounts
of about 27 basis points. We also find that financially constrained consumers (min.down) pay a big
premium relative to unconstrained consumers. Putting down the minimum payment is associated
with a 11 basis points increase in rates.
Next we look at the effect credit worthiness on rates. Two sets of variables measure this in Ta-
ble VII: credit score categories and access to other forms of credit (other debt). The literature on
‘risk-based pricing’ suggests that interest rate dispersion in many credit markets can largely be
explained by heterogeneity in borrower risk levels and the ability of financial institutions to dis-
criminate between borrowers according to these differences. In our data, CREDIT is a categori-
cal variable with four risk categories. The highest risk category represents the most creditworthy
borrowers (credit scoring in Canada is done by the same two companies as in the United States:
Equifax and TransUnion). The omitted category, CREDIT1 represents borrowers who are the least
credit worthy. Despite the fact that contracts are insured, we find that borrowers with better credit
scores receive larger discounts.
The variable Other Debt measures consumers’ access to other forms of credit, and our results
suggest a similar negative relationship between rates and access: consumers with better access
pay lower rates. However, it should be noted that this variable is subject to measurement error
that biases the coefficient downwards. This error is related to the fact that we do not observe
the actual negotiation date, and use the posted-rate at closing to recover an estimate of other
debts from the TDS ratio. This creates a negative relationship between margins (also measured at
closing), and other debts.
Renters, Parents, and Switchers all receive lower rates. The base category for Renters and
Parents is Previous home-owners. Borrowers in the base category are likely older than in the other
two categories. Our results suggest, therefore, that first-time buyers receive discounts relative to
previous owners. The Switcher variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the borrower signs a mortgage
with a financial institution that is not his/her main financial institution at the time of the mortgage
origination. The lender is therefore attracting a new client. Our estimates suggest that new clients
receive larger discounts than existing clients, on the order of 6.5 basis points over the full sample.
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Over the full sample the average impact of a mortgage broker is to reduce rates by 15 basis
points. Using a broker, therefore, is associated with a reduction in monthly mortgage payments of
about $19. In total using a broker can save a borrower approximately $1,167 in interest costs over
5 years. Brokers are a significant factor, therefore, in driving discounts. This result is in sharp con-
trast to the mutual fund industry, for example, where Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009)
find that on a risk-adjusted basis brokers actually delivered lower returns to consumers than direct
channels between 1996-2004 in the U.S. It also appears to be in sharp contrast to the U.S. mortgage-
broker experience where due to the lack of fiduciary duties mortgage brokers led borrowers to
sign unfavorable contracts (Hall and Woodward (2010) or Berndt, Hollifield, and Sandås (2010)).
It should be pointed out that in our estimation there might be unobserved borrower characteristics
that affect both the decision to shop with a broker and outcomes. For instance, financially literate
borrowers are likely to get better rate quotes regardless of whether they use a broker or not. If
these borrowers are also more prone to shop with a broker, this may inflate the coefficient on the
broker variable. On the other hand, the coefficient on the broker variable would be downward
biased if poorer or more financially constrained households recognized that they would be at a
disadvantage when bargaining and therefore more likely to hire a broker (similar to Scott Morton,
Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2003) in the car market). In Section IV(iv), we address this selection
problem directly.
Columns (3)-(4) provide more disaggregated information. The results in column (3) are almost
identical to those in (1) and (2) suggesting that the no-haggle policy of TD Canada Trust had
little overall impact on the factors influencing discounting. Column (4) focuses on borrowers
who sign mortgages at one of the 8 largest mortgage providers (Big 8) in Canada. Given that the
coefficients are largely the same across columns, the main conclusion are not being driven by the
fringe institutions.
Our findings point to the possibility that the observed rate dispersion reflects price discrim-
ination and not just cost differences across consumers/contracts. The fact that rates are higher
in more concentrated markets, suggests that financial institutions with greater market power can
charge higher rates. Importantly, however, the number of competitors is not the only factor that
influences rates. Our results are consistent with our hypothesis that the ability of consumers to put
lenders into competition and to generate outside quotes may also play a role. Richer households
pay higher rates, consistent with the fact that they are less inclined to engage in time-consuming
search and negotiation. Switchers pay lower rates, a finding that is in line with the extensive lit-
erature documenting that loyal consumers’ unwillingness to engage in search generates market
power for firms (e.g. see Klemperer (1995)). Borrowers shopping through brokers, who typically
search over more lenders, receive lower rates.
While differences in search costs may be a factor in explaining the positive income coefficient, it
is also true that, conditional on loan size, richer households are more likely to pre-pay their mort-
gage early, yielding lower revenue for the lender. Also, the timing of home purchase creates a pos-
itive correlation between the interest rate levels and income: poorer households are more likely to
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qualify for mortgage insurance when interest rates low. This is because the Government/insurer
imposes a maximum of 40% debt-service to income ratio.
Future profitability also explains our findings that financially constrained borrowers and bor-
rowers with poorer credit scores pay higher interest rates. Our finding that first-time buyers pay
lower rates is consistent with Goldberg (1996) who, in the context of the car market, finds evidence
of price discrimination. She finds that households under the age of 30 who have not previously
purchased a car receive discounts relative to experienced buyers. We can compare the dollar
savings of our proxy for first-time buyers with Goldberg’s proxy for first-time buyers. For the
typical mortgage first-time buyers save around $506 over 5 years. Goldberg (1996) finds that first-
time buyers receive a discount of approximately $440. The average car loan is approximately 70
months (bankrate.com), therefore the savings per year are $75, which is approximately what we
find in the mortgage market.
While our findings are consistent with the presence of price discrimination in the mortgage
market, so far we have only presented correlations. In the next two subsections our aim is to
provide direct evidence of discriminatory behavior on the part of lenders.
IV(iii). Quantile regression analysis. We use quantile regression to implement our first test of
price discrimination. For each covariate, we test whether or not the reduced-form marginal effect
is constant across the percentiles of the unobserved components of transaction prices, and whether
it is zero at the low end of the conditional distribution. Specifically, we re-estimate specification
(1) from Table VII above for each conditional quantile:
(3) Qτ
(
Margini|Xi, βτ
)
= Xiβτ , for each τ ∈ (0, 1).
The conditional quantiles of the margin distribution capture the distribution of the outcomes
of the negotiation, conditional on observed borrower and lender characteristics. Low quantiles
represent borrowers who received a relatively large discount given the value of their covariates,
while high quantiles are borrowers receiving almost no discount. By conditioning on a very rich
set of financial characteristics that affect the profitability of the transaction, what is left largely
reflects borrowers’ unobserved bargaining leverage. If we assume for instance that differences in
bargaining leverage stem from differences in search costs, then low quantiles are consumers with
low search costs who are able to gather quotes from multiple lenders or with good negotiation
skills, while higher quantiles are consumers with larger search costs.
The quantile regression results are presented in Table VIII. We estimate a separate quantile
regression for each of five conditional percentiles: 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th. For house-
hold characteristics such as income, credit scores, and other debt, a consistent non-linear pattern
emerges where the marginal effect is smallest at the low end of the distribution, largest near the
75th percentile, and turns back toward zero at the top end. For example, the marginal effect of a
better CREDIT score or of being a new consumer (switcher) on margins is increasing in the trans-
action rate up until the 75th percentile, at which point the marginal effect on margins begins to
decrease. Differences in expected rates for consumers with good and bad credit-scores are larger
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in the middle of the margin distribution, than at the two ends. This particular non-linear shape
implies less consumer-based pricing at the bottom and top of the conditional margin distribution.
In the last two columns of the table, we formally evaluate the statistical significance of this
relationship by reporting the results of equality tests of coefficients at the 75th and 5th percentiles,
and at the 95th and 75th percentiles. We chose the 75th percentile since it corresponds to the
inflection point for most of the variables.20 The majority of covariates are statistically different
across the conditional distribution of rates. The exceptions are the renter and parents variables
(where the omitted group is previous home-owners), and most of the LTV’s.
What conclusions can we draw from the quantile analysis? At the top of the conditional margin
distribution, the fraction of consumers paying the posted rate approaches one. Since the posted
rate is effectively a price ceiling, and does not vary across banks or regions, the marginal effect of
observed characteristics should be zero at the top. This interpretation is consistent with the fact
that approximately 25% of consumers pay the posted rate, which implies an inflection point near
the 75th percentile of the distribution. While we reject the null hypothesis of zero effect at the
95th percentile, the differences relative to the 75th percentiles are statistically significant almost
everywhere. Most coefficients are between two and three times smaller in magnitude in column
(5) than in column (4).
The fact that the coefficients are not all zero at the 95th percentile is reflecting the time-series
variation in posted-rates, and the endogenous timing of home purchase. For instance, consumers
are less likely to purchase expensive houses when interest rates are high, and poorer households
are more likely to qualify for a loan when rates are low. Our results therefore suggest that inter-
temporal variations in the posted rate affects the characteristics of consumers shopping for mort-
gages, especially the wealth and type of houses that are purchased.
As discussed above, differences between the bottom and middle of the distribution are con-
sistent with discrimination. If transaction rates reflect solely consumer-specific lending costs, the
marginal effects on rates should be constant across unobservable attributes of borrowers (up to
the constraint imposed by the posted price). This is clearly not the case. Instead, for most char-
acteristics, consumers at the bottom of the price distribution exhibit smaller marginal effects (in
absolute values) than consumers near the 75th percentile. This suggests the presence of discrimi-
nation. Interpreting the distribution as stemming from search costs or bargaining ability leads us
to conclude that lenders price differently depending on the bargaining leverage of borrowers.
Not all characteristics have a zero impact on margins at the bottom of the distribution. In fact
only variables that we associate with the structure of the local market are such that the βτ ’s are not
statistically different from zero at the top and bottom percentiles. This finding is consistent with
our price discrimination interpretation: these variables should not affect the cost of lending, but
rather the ability of consumers to gather competitive quotes. Consumers with good unobserved
negotiation skills are therefore able generate enough competition between lenders to pay a rate
equal to the lending cost, irrespective of how many lenders are present in their neighborhood.
20Figures of the same coefficients estimated across a finer percentile grid are available upon request.
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Similarly, consumers at the top of the distribution pay a rate that reflects the ceiling of the nego-
tiation, either the posted price or the value of not buying a house, both of which are independent
of our concentration measures.
For most of the other characteristics, the quantile estimates are different from zero across all per-
centiles. This suggests that borrower financial characteristics affect both the cost of lending, and
the ability of lenders to price discriminate. Consider for instance the case of the coefficients asso-
ciated with house-price. While consumers financing larger loans tend to receive larger discounts
across all percentiles of the u distribution, consumers near the 75th percentile are particularly
impacted by variations in house price. This is consistent with an interpretation that consumers
financing larger loans have more incentive to actively search for discounts, and therefore, on av-
erage, have more bargaining leverage. This difference however is irrelevant for borrowers with
good unobserved negotiation skills: for low percentile consumers consumers (i.e. high ui’s) the
marginal effect of house price reflects only the impact of loan size on lenders’ cost. Under this
interpretation, the difference in this coefficient between the 75th-percentile and 5th-percentile bor-
rowers isolates the effect of house price on consumers’ incentive to gather more quotes.
Overall, we find evidence that consumers at the bottom of the price distribution exhibit smaller
marginal effects than those near the middle of the distribution – market structure variables have
zero effect at the bottom and other financial variables have smaller effects at the bottom than near
the median. These findings suggest that, relative to borrowers at the bottom of the distribution,
those in the middle are discriminated against.
IV(iv). Broker analysis. Our second test compares the marginal effect of borrower and lender
characteristics on rates across contracts that were negotiated with and without the help of a mort-
gage broker. These two groups of transactions differ because, as discussed in Section II, on av-
erage, brokers search for more quotes than do borrowers shopping independently. We therefore
think of brokers as having more bargaining leverage than individual borrowers. In the context
of the model, hiring a broker is akin to an upward shift in the distribution of ui. If banks price
discriminate, this should produce a change in the reduced form relationship between margins and
characteristics affecting the search effort of individual borrowers. This hypothesis is akin to the
quantile test performed above.
Alternatively, it may be that the effort put forth by brokers is independent of the characteristics
that shift the search intensity of borrowers. Mortgage brokers tend to establish repeated relation-
ships with the same group of lenders, and are motivated by the desire to establish a reputation as a
“good” negotiator. Table IV illustrates that brokers transact with different lenders than consumers
negotiating on their own. In particular, many broker contracts are issued by fringe banks or trust
companies. These factors could imply that brokers are more likely to use a “blind” search ap-
proach and gather the same number of quotes irrespectively of consumer characteristics Xi. This
would correspond to a change in the form of the markup function µ(·), rather than a shift in the ui
distribution. Importantly, if lenders engage in price discrimination when individually negotiating
contracts, this would also produce statistically different marginal effects across the two groups.
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This second interpretation of the role of brokers makes this test different from the quantile test
performed above.
As with the quantile test, the broker test relies on the assumption that broker use does not
modify the marginal effect of covariates on costs:
∣∣∣ ∂ci∂X |B=1∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ ∂ci∂X |B=0∣∣∣. Therefore, if we observe
a difference between the marginal effect of covariates on rates with and without brokers, then
it must be that
∣∣∂m
∂X |B=1
∣∣ 6= ∣∣∂m∂X |B=0∣∣. In other words, transacting through a broker rather than
shopping alone changes the bargaining leverage of borrowers.
So far we have implicitly assumed that broker selection is independent of unobserved bargain-
ing abilities. However, it is likely that unobserved factors correlated with ui also affect the likeli-
hood with which borrowers choose to use a broker. For instance, borrowers with poor negotiation
skills might be more inclined to hire a broker. This would bias the broker-effect downwards, and
induce a shift in the ui distribution that is not caused by the behavior of brokers, but rather by the
type of consumers selecting into the broker category.
In the empirical implementation, we correct for the endogenous selection of brokers using a
control-function approach. In particular, our main estimating equation is similar to equation 2,
but allows for heterogenous effects of borrowers and lenders characteristics:
(4) Margini = Xiβ + (Xi · Brokeri)βBroker + Ziγ + σλ̂i + εi,
where λ̂i denotes the inverse-mills ratio associated with the probability of choosing a broker, and
Zi is a vector of control variables that we assume have homogenous effects on margins (week
fixed-effects, aggregate census variables, missing-value indicators, province fixed-effects, etc). The
Xi vector includes every financial and demographic characteristic of the borrower, variables mea-
suring the structure of local markets, and lender fixed-effects.
We model the probability of using a broker using a Probit model. In this first-stage regression,
we include the same control variables used to explain margins, and also control for the presence
of brokers near the purchased house. This represents our exclusion restriction assumption: the
presence of mortgage brokers does not affect the negotiated rates directly, but determines the
ability of consumers to use brokers. Borrowers who do not have brokers in their neighborhoods
or who have a small selection of brokers to choose from should be less likely to use a broker than
borrowers with many broker options.
We use two measures of broker presence: the number of broker agents and the ratio of broker
agents to brokerage firms (hereafter denoted by the broker share). Both variables are measured
within a 5 KM radius of a borrower’s FSA; the same choice-set definition we use for lenders.
Between 1999 and 2004, brokers progressively entered nearly every market in our data-set, and
increasingly organized their services into regional firms. The two variables therefore capture re-
gional differences in the diffusion of brokers, and the increase in the concentration of the broker
market. Since we also control for week and province fixed-effects, the two variables do not exploit
variation due to aggregate trends or systematic regional differences in rates and adoption.21
21A potential limitation of the instruments is that they may be correlated with the unobservable characteristics of
borrowers in a neighborhood. Specifically, brokers may enter markets where they perceive consumers to have poorer
negotiating skills. We include province fixed effects and FSA-level census variables, which should lessen this concern.
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We gathered broker location information from a directory of brokers collected annually by the
Canadian Association of Accredited Mortgage Professionals. The directory has information on the
broker and his/her associated firm. We then use Mapquest and Google Maps to measure distances
from the households in our main data set to each broker-agent. The directory is missing for three
years: 1999, 2000 and 2002. We first impute the 2002 locations by interpolating the number of
agents and firms using the 2001 and 2003 data. Next, we impute the missing values for 1999/2000,
by estimating a log-linear regression model of the number of agents and number of firms by FSA
using the 2001-2004 data, controlling for region-level log-linear trends and FSA fixed-effects. We
use the fitted values to predict the number of agents and average share in 1999 and 2000.22
The results are presented in Table IX. In column (1) we present the coefficients from the broker
selection equation. High income borrowers are less likely to use brokers, as are high credit-score
borrowers, borrowers in markets with a high concentration of lenders. Credit-constrained bor-
rowers are more likely to use a broker, as are renters and borrowers exiting from living with their
parents. Importantly the two variables measuring the presence of brokers are highly significant.
The chi-square statistic testing the null hypothesis of joint zero effect is equal to 39, and both vari-
ables have economically significant effects on the probability of using a broker. A one standard-
deviation increase in the number of brokers (i.e. an increase of 6.4) is predicted to increase the
probability of using a broker by 1.9%.
In columns (2) and (3) we show the marginal effects on rates assuming that βBroker = 0 for all
variables but the intercept. Column (2) presents results from the OLS regression without con-
trolling for selection (as in column (1) of Table VII), and column (3) controls for the inverse-mills
ratio. The coefficient σ is positive and significant, suggesting that not only is there selection on
observables, but there is also selection on unobservables.
Comparing columns (2) and (3) we can see that not correcting for selection leads to a downward
bias in the broker coefficient. The sign of the bias suggests that households who would otherwise
negotiate relatively smaller discounts on their own for unobserved reasons are more likely to hire
a broker. This bias is sizeable: we estimate that brokers are able to negotiate rates that are on
average 40 basis-points lower than individual borrowers, compared to 15 basis-points in column
(2). Column (3) also shows that part of this difference is induced by a change in some of the coef-
ficients affected by the inclusion of the inverse-mills ratio. This is especially the case for variables
that are strongly correlated with the decision to use a broker, such as the switcher and new-home
buyer variables (i.e. renters and parents). For instance, when controlling for selection we find that
rates for switchers are no longer statistically different from those for loyal consumers. In contrast,
they are found to be 11 bps lower without the correction.
Our discrimination test is based on the results reported in column (6), which calculate the dif-
ference between columns (4) and (5). These columns show the relative importance of contractual
and demographic characteristics for broker transactions versus individual transactions. We do not
22Qualitatively the results are not sensitive to how we impute the broker locations. We also experimented with using
data on locations from 2005-2009 as an out-of-sample instrument and the results are similar. Results are also similar if
we just use locations in 2001 or 2004 as the instrument.
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report the average effect of brokers in this specification since the model allows for heterogenous
effects of brokers across lenders.
The first thing to note from comparing columns (4) and (5) is that for most of the covariates,
the coefficients in the broker sample are significantly different than those from the branch sam-
ple. Like in the quantile regressions above, this suggests that banks are able to price discriminate
between borrowers with different bargaining leverage.
The difference is most important for variables related to loan size and down-payment. For these
groups of variables, we find that the marginal effects are closer to zero in the broker sample. Bor-
rowers with smaller down-payments pay significantly higher rates than those with bigger down-
payments in the branch sample, but this difference is insignificant in the broker sample. The same
is true of the house price variable. These findings are consistent with the fact that borrowers who are
credit-constrained or financing larger loans are less likely to engage in time-consuming search and
negotiation. Therefore, when shopping alone these borrowers are discriminated against. Since
brokers either search over more lenders and/or are unaffected in their effort by variables that in-
fluence the search intensity of consumers, price discrimination disappears or is diminished in the
broker sample.
We also find that borrowers transiting out of renting or living with their parents pay lower
rates than previous home owners in the branch sample, but this difference is insignificant in the
broker sample. This difference is the largest for borrowers living with their parents. Recall that
these are likely younger households shopping for their first mortgage. This suggests that younger
households are putting relatively more effort in shopping for discounts than brokers, and/or that
brokers do not use the age of borrowers when negotiating on their behalf. A survey conducted
by Ipsos-Reid (Ipsos-Reid (1999-2006)) for the Bank of Canada confirms the first hypothesis. New
home-buyers are 20 percent more likely to gather multiple quotes than previous home owners and
renewers (i.e. 70% versus 50%).
The same factors are at play when it comes to the market structure variables. The difference is
negative and statistically significant, which implies that borrowers shopping alone in more con-
centrated neighborhoods have less bargaining leverage, and end up paying higher rates. How-
ever, concentration and the relative network of lenders does not affect rates negotiated by brokers.
This is consistent with the idea that brokers typically transact with smaller financial institutions,
and might gather quotes from lenders located in other markets.
Borrowers with higher credit scores pay significantly lower rates than those with poorer scores
in both the branch and broker samples. Looking at the results in column (6) we see that, relative to
the lowest credit-score category, choosing to use a broker lowers rates by roughly 5 basis points.
This gain is constant across intermediate and high credit-score loans. The fact that this difference
is constant implies that consumers in the lowest credit-score category pay higher rates when they
transact with a broker than when they search on their own. In contrast, the intermediate and
high credit-score types pay roughly the same rates with and without brokers. Therefore, price
difference across credit-score types are amplified when using a broker, unlike what we see for
loan size, downpayment and market structure.
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Not all results are consistent with our conclusions from the quantile regressions. This is partic-
ularly the case for loyal consumers, and for the income variable. Contrary to the quantile regres-
sion results, the premium paid by loyal consumers is not statistically different across the broker
and non-broker contracts. The same is true of the income variable. These differences offer some
support for our second interpretation of the role of brokers, namely that they engage in “blind”
search.
Finally, it is interesting to note that after interacting the variables with the broker dummy in
columns (4) and (5), the inverse-mills ratio coefficient is not statistically different from zero. This
suggest that the endogenous selection bias that we find in first two specifications is mostly caused
by the fact that the reduced-form pricing equation differs between broker and non-broker trans-
actions. Unreported specifications clearly show that this is mostly due to the fact that banks offers
different average discounts to brokers (e.g. some banks charge more to brokers on average), and
that brokers tend deal with different types of lenders.
Overall, our results suggest that brokers engage in more search, since the average interest rate is
significantly lower in the sample of broker-negotiated contracts. Our analysis does not permit to
say which of the two interpretations is more important (i.e. blind or better search), but our results
are consistent with the notion that price discrimination is mitigated by brokers.
V. DISCUSSION
The evidence presented here shows that there is considerable rate dispersion in the Canadian
mortgage market. Our findings suggest that once the effect of risk-screening has been removed,
dispersion in the mortgage market arises from the same sources as in traditional retail markets
where a number of studies have documented important dispersion in prices (see for example
Borenstein and Rose (1994), Goldberg (1996), Lach (2002), and Delgado and Waterson (2003)). Our
tests provide support for the hypothesis that part of the observed dispersion in rates is caused by
price discrimination in which lenders charge higher rates to borrowers with poor bargaining lever-
age. In particular, we find that consumers with poor financial characteristics and little leverage
pay relatively higher rates than consumers with the same characteristics, but better leverage.
Our analysis is descriptive, and does not quantify the relative importance of price discrimina-
tion versus unobserved lending cost heterogeneity in explaining dispersion. However, our quan-
tile analysis suggests that financial characteristics of borrowers affect the lending cost of banks,
and therefore a sizeable fraction of the observed rate dispersion is due to borrower-specific cost
heterogeneity. In particular, we find that borrowers financing larger loans, and those with low
financial risks obtain larger discounts. This is true even at the low-end of the price distribution.
There are a number of reasons that costs could differ across borrowers, despite the fact that
we study insured contracts. Borrowers are allowed to prepay a certain fraction of their mort-
gage which can lower the expected revenue from the mortgage for the lender. Although we do
not observe the ex-post performance of each contract, recent surveys suggest that annual pre-
payment amounts and payment frequencies greatly vary across borrowers (Deng, Quigley, and
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Order (2000)). There are also transaction costs associated with default and delinquency, and het-
erogeneity in the likelihood of default across borrowers. In addition there is heterogeneity in the
future profitability of consumers to the lender. First, given the one-stop shopping nature of Cana-
dian banking, there are profits stemming from the purchase of complementary services, with some
borrowers consuming more of these other services. Second, because of the structure of Canadian
mortgage contracts, there are profits arising from future contracts signed between the two parties,
with some borrowers being more likely to renegotiate with their current lender than others, and
having larger amounts remaining to finance.
Our findings have important implications for regulators designing mortgage-market policies.
Given the increasing levels of concentration in mortgage markets throughout the world, there is
concern as to extent to which these markets are competitive. Our results confirming the presence
of price discrimination imply that mortgage markets, at least in Canada, are something less than
competitive. However, this lack of competition is consumer specific. Consumers able to generate
competition amongst lenders pay rates that reflect their effective marginal cost, while those who
are unable to do so pay rates above this.
The theory literature on price discrimination provides ambiguous predictions with respect to
the welfare impact of price dispersion, since it mostly involves monetary transfers between het-
erogeneous groups of consumers. In the context of mortgage lending however, the presence of
significant residual rate dispersion can distort borrowing decisions by increasing the risk of de-
fault on consumers with poor negotiation skills and encouraging some consumers too borrow
excessively. We find for instance that financially constrained borrowers pay a significant premium
when negotiating on their own, and that consumers financing larger loans are able to obtain size-
able discounts by putting more effort into search. The resulting dispersion, if it leads to higher
default probability, can induce systemic risks and generate negative externalities on the overall
market.23 These considerations are absent from the traditional welfare calculations judging the
impact of price discrimination, but should be part of the policy debate surrounding the regulation
of consumer financial markets.
Of course these welfare effects will differ depending on borrower characteristics. Borrowers
paying higher rates with high credit risk may be more likely to default than borrowers with high
income paying higher rates. Note that there may also be related distributional effects from the
conduct of monetary policy when mortgage rates are related to things other than cost, such as
search or market power. For instance, our finding that financially-constrained borrowers pay the
highest rates suggest an amplification effect of monetary policy, since these are the borrowers who
can least afford a rate increase. Survey evidence suggests that a significant fraction of borrowers
would not be able to make their payments if interest rates rose even slightly.24
23For example, if price discrimination leads to excessive leverage by certain households, then these will be more vul-
nerable to negative shocks, with potential macroeconomic effects through the demand channel (Main and Sufi (2012))
24The 2011 CAAMP survey found that 4% of mortgage holders claimed that they would not be able to afford their
mortgage if interest rates rose by 25 basis points. 21% of borrowers claimed they could not afford their mortgage if
rates increased by anywhere from 25 basis points to 199 basis points. In 2010 only 2.6% and 15.5% answered the same
questions, respectively.
23
Our results also suggest that the number of banks in a market may be less relevant than con-
sumers’ ability to put whatever number of banks are present into competition by searching over
and negotiating with multiple lenders. Search and negotiation makes discrimination more diffi-
cult. These findings point to the need for policies aimed at increasing financial literacy in order to
improve the negotiation abilities of borrowers. Recent papers on literacy and the sophistication of
borrowers, Hall and Woodward (2010), Campbell, Jackson, Madrian, and Tufano (2011), Campbell
(2009), Geraldi, Goette, and Meier (2010), all point to the fact that deficiencies in this area can lead
consumers to overpay for loans. Possible remedies for this problem include (i) improved trans-
parency in the lending process and in particular in rate setting, (ii) fiduciary duties for brokers
(where brokers do not yet have them), and (iii) no-haggle pricing. We discuss each in turn.
Greater transparency about rate setting could be achieved by having the government publish
information on the distribution of discounts as a function of groups of characteristics. To this end
the Canadian government has just established a Code of Conduct for Federally Regulated Finan-
cial Institutions designed to enhance borrower awareness and to “explain the differences between
mortgage products, including ways to pay off a mortgage faster without incurring penalties.”
The evidence we have presented above suggests that brokers with fiduciary duty are able to
generate better offers for borrowers transacting through them. Moreover, our results provide evi-
dence that brokers make discrimination based on most financial characteristics more difficult: we
observe less dispersion based on observed characteristics for contracts negotiated through bro-
kers. These findings are in contrast to the results in Hall and Woodward (2010), which show that
brokers without fiduciary duty benefit from confusion in the lending and rate setting processes to
charge higher rates. Recent initiatives in the U.S. have moved towards improving transparency
and protecting consumers. These include the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau which
has as a goal to educate consumers about mortgages, the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mort-
gage Licensing (SAFE) Act which requires U.S. states to enforce licensing of mortgage brokers ac-
cording to a national standard, and the Loan Officer Compensation rule, a Federal Reserve Board
rule governing compensation of mortgage brokers.
The adoption by the banks of a no-haggle pricing policy would eliminate the need for con-
sumers to engage in costly search and difficult bargaining, and in so doing, remove the possibility
for lenders to discriminate on the ease with which different consumers can perform these func-
tions.
It is important to note, however, that policies designed to increase transparency of improve fi-
nancial literacy may have significant distributional effects, and that not all consumers will benefit.
Borrowers with good leverage will not be helped by these policies, and may actually be harmed if
prices are more uniform as they would be under a no-haggle policy. In contrast, policies designed
to increase competition by bringing more negotiation partners to the table will serve only to ben-
efit those consumers who engage in search and negotiation. Consumers unable or unwilling to
obtain multiple quotes will not be affected by the level of competition in the market. The other
side of this is that policies designed to limit concentration, for instance by preventing mergers,
will provide limited benefit for those consumers paying the highest rates.
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Our results are also relevant for the design of regulations for consumer financial markets more
broadly. Our finding that credit scores are associated with price discrimination in the absence of
credit risk suggests a dual role for credit scoring in traditional credit markets. Specifically, credit
scoring not only improves the lender’s signal about expected credit losses, but also reveals some-
thing about the extent to which the borrower will be discriminated against. Again, this suggests
an increased role for transparency. Borrowers must be made aware of the benefits of generating
more competition at the quote gathering stage. Individual characteristics will influence rates only
for those borrowers able to generate competition.
In closing, we should point out that the results presented here may also be relevant for health-
and other-insurance markets. In these cases, there is significant price dispersion, which could
either be explained by cost/risk differences or price discrimination, or both. Consumers in these
markets must also negotiate rates with individual firms and can search over and negotiate with
competing players in order to achieve better rates.
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APPENDIX B. TABLES
TABLE I. Banking Habits of Canadians: 1999-2006
We report summary statistics on bank account(s) usage using data from an annual survey conducted by Ipsos-Reid
called the Canadian Financial Monitor. The survey consists of approximately 12,000 households per year. Allen, Clark,
and Houde (2008) use this survey to analyze the diffusion of electronic banking in Canada between 1998-2006. We
define a household’s main financial institution as the institution corresponding to the most active checking account.
Account Main FI Second FI All other FI
Mortgage (all) 67.4% 10.9% 21.7%a
Mortgage (no broker) 70.3% 10.8% 18.9%
Mortgage (broker) 37.3% 30.6% 32.1%
Loan 55.8% 9.6% 34.6%
Credit cardb 77.9% 20.7% 1.4%
GIC or term deposit 72.8% 15.8% 11.4%
Bonds, t-bills, other guaranteed invest’s 45.3% 7.8% 46.9%
Mutual fundsc 38.8% 7.2% 54.0%
a:Most mortgages classified as “other” have the lender as category “any bank” or “any credit
union”, which does not match with the more specific name the respondent provided when
responding to the question about their main financial institution. b: The credit card category
excludes retail cards. The average household has 2.5 cards although half of these are retail
cards, which can only be used at the retail outlet that issued the card. GIC is an acronym
for Government Investment Certificate. These are fixed term deposits, typically 1-3 years. c:
Investor Group Inc. has the largest market share of the mutual fund industry in Canada and
they are not a deposit-taking institution which explains the relatively low share of mutual
funds held at households main financial institution.
TABLE II. Definition of Household / Mortgage Characteristics
Name Description
FI Type of lender
Source Identifies how lender generated the loan (branch, online, broker, etc)
Income Total amount of the borrower(s) salary, wages, and income from other sources
TSD Ratio of total debt service to income
Duration Length of the relationship between the borrower and FI
R-status Borrowers residential status upon insurance application
FSA Forward sortation area of the mortgaged property
Market value Selling price or estimated market price if refinancing
Applicant type Quartile of the borrowers risk of default
Dwelling type 10 options that define the physical structure
Close Closing date of purchase or date of refinance
Loan amount Dollar amount of the loan excluding the loan insurance premium
Premium Loan insurance premium
Purpose Purpose of the loan (purchase, port, refinance, etc.)
LTV Loan amount divided by lending value
Price Interest rate of the mortgage
Term Represents the term over which the interest rate applies to the loan
Amortization Represents the period the loan will be paid off
Interest type Fixed or adjustable rate
CREDIT Summarized application credit score (minimum borrower credit score).
Some variables were only included by one of the mortgage insurers.
TABLE III. Summary Description of Discrete Variables: 1999-2004
Variable Choice Percentage of Contracts
Source† branch 64.5%
broker 35.5%
Dwelling type detached 63.3%
semi-detached 12.3%
row or mobile 11.9%
apartment/condo 12.3%
Residential status‡ own 21.6%
rent 69.6%
parents 8.8%
TABLE IV. Broker usage by Financial Institution Type: 1999-2004
Broker Bank Branch
Big 6 28.0 72.0
Credit Unions 31.4 68.6
Trust companies 56.7 43.3
Other Financial institutions 79.8 20.2
TABLE V. Summary Description of Continuous Variables: 1999-2004
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev.
Borrower/lender relationship‡
full sample 48.0 mth 2 mths 71.4 mths
home-owners 67.7 mths 40 mths 80.8 mths
non-home-owners 41.3 mths 1 mth 66.9 mths
Loan amount
full sample $143,849 $134,440 $60,908
previous owners $153,270 $143,078 $65,516
new owners $141,243 $131,156 $60,532
Buying price of house
full sample $158,760 $147,619 $68,943
previous owners $171,847 $159,203 $75,611
new owners $154,950 $143,327 $67,853
LTV
full sample 91.1 91.6 4.47
previous owners 89.7 90.0 4.90
new owners 91.6 93.5 4.22
Household income
full sample $67,953 $63,846 $26,821
previous owners $76,638 $72,125 $29,684
new owners $65,692 $62,032 $25,287
TDS
full sample 32.1 33.0 5.96
previous owners 32.9 34.1 5.77
new owners 32.4 33.3 5.78
Transaction price minus adjusted bond rate
full sample 1.23% 1.17% 0.65%
previous owners 1.26% 1.20% 0.65%
new owners 1.24% 1.19% 0.63%
Posted price minus adjusted bond rate 1.91% 1.90% 0.43%
Continued on next page...
... table V continued
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev.
HHI (5KM) 0.2020 0.1797 0.1111
Relative network (5KM) 1.27 1.11 0.99
Notes: Nominal values are deflated using the consumer price index, base=2002. The home-owner and non-
home-owner categories are based on CMHC data, since CMHC is the only insurer to collect this information.
The full sample is CMHC and Genworth combined. Cost of funding is based on the five year bond rate.
TABLE VI. Variance Decomposition
Period: 1992-1998 Period: 1999-2004
Group Variance Group Variance
std-dev decomp. std-dev decomp.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Groups
Closing month 0.406 0.421 0.269 0.180
Financial charcteristics 0.079 0.016 0.096 0.023
Location 0.093 0.022 0.129 0.041
Lender/network size 0.061 0.009 0.085 0.018
Residual dispersion 0.456 0.531 0.546 0.738
Nominal dispersion 0.633 0.641
The observed dispersion is decomposed between groups by projecting observed transaction margins on four groups
of categorical variables: yi = α +
∑4
x=1
∑Jx
j=1 1(xi = j)βxj + ei, where x refers to period dummies (weeks), discrete
financial attributes (loan X LTV X Income quartiles), location dummies (FAS), and lender/network size categories
(Lender X relative network size deciles). Group std-dev refers to the standard-deviation of βxj across categories j
within each group x, weighted by the number of observations within each category. Variance decomposition measures
the share of the total variance attributed to each group.
TABLE VII. Regression Results Including Observable Borrower/Lender Characteristics
(1999-2004)
Dependent Variable: Transaction Rate minus adjusted bond rate (margin)
HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of branches in a borrowers 5KM neighborhood. Relative network is the fraction
of branches owned by the lender in the borrowers 5KM neighborhood. Renter is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
borrower was a renter prior to applying for a mortgage. Parents is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower was living
with his/her parents prior to applying for a mortgage. Renters and Parents are relative to previous owners. Switcher is
a dummy variable indicating a borrower has signed a mortgage with a financial institution that is not their main financial
institution. Broker is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower used a broker to facilitate the mortgage transaction.
There are 4 credit categories, the base is CREDIT1. The highest credit category represents the most creditworthy borrowers.
Income and the house price are divided by one hundred-thousands, and Other debt is measured in thousands of dollars.
Column (1) has both Genworth and CMHC households while Columns (2)-(4) use only CMHC households. Column (3)
excludes the Nov 2002-December 2004 period because TD Bank experimented with a no haggle pricing policy. Column (4)
includes borrowers only at the largest 8 financial institutions. Controls include FSA census variables in 2001. We include
week and bank fixed effects in all specifications. Standards errors are clustered at the FSA level. † p<0.01, [ p<0.05.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Full CMHC Haggle Big 8
log(House price) -0.27† -0.26† -0.28† -0.27†
(0.0085) (0.0090) (0.010) (0.0095)
log(Income) 0.20† 0.21† 0.20† 0.19†
(0.0099) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
log(Other debt) -0.075† -0.076† -0.076† -0.077†
(0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0047)
0.85 ≤ LTV < 90 0.018† 0.0076 0.030† 0.043†
(0.0068) (0.0074) (0.0079) (0.0073)
0.90 ≤ LTV < 0.95 0.044† 0.036† 0.055† 0.081†
(0.0086) (0.0093) (0.010) (0.0090)
Min. down 0.11† 0.077† 0.10† 0.15†
(0.0078) (0.0083) (0.0090) (0.0081)
CREDIT2 -0.068† -0.079† -0.076† -0.056†
(0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0066)
CREDIT3 -0.11† -0.13† -0.12† -0.10†
(0.0055) (0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0061)
CREDIT4 -0.16† -0.17† -0.17† -0.14†
(0.0056) (0.0060) (0.0065) (0.0062)
Renters -0.016† -0.015† -0.014[ -0.020†
(0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0064) (0.0060)
Parents -0.065† -0.061† -0.067† -0.067†
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.010) (0.0094)
Switcher -0.11† -0.12† -0.12† -0.077†
(0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0074) (0.0070)
Relative network 0.020† 0.018† 0.019† 0.018†
(0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0044)
Branch HHI 0.064† 0.070† 0.062[ 0.075†
(0.021) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023)
Broker -0.15† -0.13† -0.15† -0.17†
(0.0060) (0.0067) (0.0071) (0.0065)
Observations 84,197 66,904 59,029 69,308
R-squared 0.320 0.325 0.349 0.323
TABLE VIII. Quantile Regression Results Including Observable Borrower/Lender Char-
acteristics (1999-2004)
Dependent Variable: Transaction Rate minus adjusted bond rate (margin)
The regressors are the same as in Table VII. All columns include week and bank fixed effects as well as province fixed
effects and FSA level census variables. Columns (1)-(5) are estimated separately for each conditional quantile: 0.05, 0.25,
0.5, 0.75, and 0.95. The last two columns report the p-values corresponding to the tests that each coefficient evaluated at
the 75th percentile is equal to its value evaluated at the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively. The tests are constructed
by jointly estimating three quantile regressions (5%, 75% and 95%), and performing 20 bootstrap replications. † p<0.01, [
p<0.05.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) P-Values
VARIABLES Q-0.05 Q-0.25 Q-0.5 Q-0.75 Q-0.95 (1) = (4) (5) = (4)
log(House price) -0.14† -0.17† -0.25† -0.31† -0.18† 0.00 0.00
(0.011) (0.0052) (0.0076) (0.010) (0.010)
log(Income) 0.089† 0.11† 0.18† 0.25† 0.18† 0.00 0.00
(0.013) (0.0060) (0.0086) (0.011) (0.011)
log(Other debt) -0.055† -0.043† -0.058† -0.070† -0.043† 0.08 0.00
(0.0061) (0.0027) (0.0039) (0.0053) (0.0052)
Low LTV 0.025† 0.012† 0.021† 0.024† -0.003 0.95 0.00
(0.0090) (0.0043) (0.0064) (0.0091) (0.0092)
High LTV 0.046† 0.028† 0.039† 0.044† 0.0089 0.93 0.00
(0.011) (0.0054) (0.0080) (0.011) (0.012)
Min down 0.061† 0.051† 0.085† 0.14† 0.083† 0.00 0.00
(0.0094) (0.0045) (0.0067) (0.0095) (0.0097)
CREDIT2 -0.030† -0.046† -0.072† -0.095† -0.055† 0.00 0.00
(0.0072) (0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0074) (0.0075)
CREDIT3 -0.045† -0.071† -0.12† -0.16† -0.095† 0.00 0.00
(0.0071) (0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0073) (0.0074)
CREDIT4 -0.071† -0.090† -0.15† -0.21† -0.14† 0.00 0.00
(0.0072) (0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0073) (0.0074)
Renters -0.008 -0.014† -0.020† -0.020† -0.012 0.27 0.38
(0.0074) (0.0035) (0.0053) (0.0074) (0.0076)
Parents -0.031† -0.032† -0.054† -0.089† -0.069† 0.00 0.17
(0.012) (0.0056) (0.0084) (0.012) (0.012)
Switcher -0.054† -0.064† -0.096† -0.15† -0.085† 0.00 0.00
(0.0073) (0.0036) (0.0053) (0.0076) (0.0081)
Relative network 0.002 0.013† 0.023† 0.029† 0.014† 0.00 0.00
(0.0034) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Branch HHI 0.018 0.089† 0.13† 0.082† 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.024) (0.012) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024)
Broker -0.085† -0.083† -0.14† -0.19† -0.11† 0.00 0.00
(0.0063) (0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0067) (0.0070)
Observations 84,182 84,182 84,182 84,182 84,182
TABLE IX. Broker Regression Results Including Observable Borrower/Lender Character-
istics (1999-2004)
Dependent Variable: Transaction Rate minus adjusted bond rate (margin)
The regressors are the same as in Table VII. All columns include week and bank fixed effects as well as province fixed effects
and FSA level census variables. Column (1) shows the marginal effects from a Probit regression for broker choice. Column
(2) shows the marginal effects from a least squares margin regression. Columns (3)-(5) shows the marginal effects from the
same margin regression, but controlling for endogenous selection of brokers using the Inverse Mills Ratio. Columns (4)-(5)
report the coefficients of regression specification in which the key explanatory variables are interacted with the branch-
managers and brokers dummy variable (i.e. financial attributes and bank fixed-effects). Standard errors are clustered at
the FSA level. First-stage χ2 statistics test the null hypothesis that the broker share and number of agents have zero effects
on broker choice probability. † p<0.01, [ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Pr(Broker) Joint Joint Non-broker Broker Difference
Marginal effects OLS CF CF CF (5)-(6)
log(House price) 0.19† -0.27† -0.25† -0.31† -0.18† 0.13†
(0.025) (0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0096) (0.013) (0.015)
log(Income) -0.31† 0.20† 0.18† 0.20† 0.18† -0.028
(0.026) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.012) (0.017) (0.019)
log(Other debt) 0.0036 -0.075† -0.075† -0.071† -0.079† -0.0085
(0.012) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0052) (0.0072) (0.0090)
0.85 ≤ LTV < 90 0.064† 0.018† 0.022† 0.041† -0.028[ -0.069†
(0.020) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0078) (0.013) (0.014)
0.90 ≤ LTV < 0.95 -0.021 0.044† 0.042† 0.066† -0.0026 -0.068†
(0.023) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.010) (0.015) (0.018)
Min. down 0.12† 0.11† 0.12† 0.14† 0.058† -0.078†
(0.021) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0088) (0.014) (0.016)
CREDIT2 -0.025 -0.068† -0.069† -0.049† -0.10† -0.052†
(0.014) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0072) (0.0088) (0.011)
CREDIT3 -0.085† -0.11† -0.12† -0.095† -0.15† -0.053†
(0.016) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0069) (0.0093) (0.012)
CREDIT4 -0.085† -0.16† -0.17† -0.14† -0.20† -0.068†
(0.016) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0069) (0.0088) (0.011)
Renters 0.31† -0.016† 0.002 -0.030† 0.024† 0.054†
(0.015) (0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0066) (0.0091) (0.0098)
Parents 0.15† -0.065† -0.055† -0.074† -0.023 0.051†
(0.025) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0096) (0.015) (0.017)
Switcher 1.25† -0.11† -0.012 -0.087† -0.080† 0.0065
(0.023) (0.0063) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.012)
Relative network -0.12† 0.020† 0.012† 0.025† -0.0011 -0.026†
(0.020) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0057)
Branch HHI -0.31† 0.064† 0.04 0.094† -0.02 -0.11†
(0.079) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.035) (0.038)
Broker 0.031 -0.15† -0.40†
(0.016) (0.0060) (0.032)
Inverse mills ratio 0.0091† 0.14† 0.025 0.025 0.025
(0.0018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Broker share 0.011∗
(0.005)
Nb. of agents 0.003†
(0.0006)
Observations 84,197 84,197 84,197 84,197 84,197 84,197
R-squared 0.32 0.321 0.327 0.327 0.327
First stage χ2 39.2
